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Domestic Bank Regulation in a Global Environment -
A Comparative Dialogue
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 14, 2012, the Center for Banking and Finance at
the University of North Carolina School of Law hosted a dialogue on
domestic bank regulation in a global environment at The Metropolitan
Club of New York. This event preceded The Clearing House's Annual
Meeting and Business Conference.' The Clearing House also provided
generous financial support for the debate. Biographical information
about the moderators, Lissa Broome and Michael Helfer, and the
panelists is set forth before the transcript of the dialogue begins.
Lissa Broome is the Wells Fargo Professor of Banking at the
University of North Carolina School of Law and also the director of the
school's Center for Banking and Finance.
Michael Heifer became vice-chairman of Citi in June 2012
after having served as its general counsel and corporate secretary for
almost ten years. Prior to joining Citigroup, Mr. Helfer was President of
Strategic Investments and Chief Strategic Officer of Nationwide
Insurance. He was formerly a partner at the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler
& Pickering.
Cyrus Amir-Mokri is the Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions at the U.S. Treasury Department. He recently served as
Senior Counsel to the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), where he was the agency's deputy representative
to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Prior to joining
1. The Clearing House is the oldest banking association and payments company in the
United States, having been established in 1853. It is owned by the world's largest
commercial banks. The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C. provides payment,
clearing, and settlement services to its member banks and other financial institutions,
clearing almost $2 trillion daily and representing nearly half of the automated-
clearinghouse, funds-transfer, and check-image payments made in the U.S. The Clearing
House Association L.L.C. is a nonpartisan advocacy organization representing the interests
of its owner banks on a variety of important banking issues.
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the CFTC, Mr. Amir-Mokri was a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP.
Chris Brummer is a Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center, B. Gray Fellow for Growth and Finance at the
Atlantic Council and senior fellow at the Milken Institute. He
previously taught at Vanderbilt Law School and has served as a visiting
professor at the universities of Basel, Heidelberg, and the London
School of Economics. He practiced law in New York City and London
with the law firm Cravath, Swaine & Moore. His book, Soft Law and
the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century, was
published this year by Cambridge University Press.
Robert Hockett is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School,
Consulting Counsel at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), recent
Resident Consultant at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and
fellow at The Century Foundation. His principal areas of expertise are
organizational, financial, and monetary law and economics, particularly
as these relate to distributive justice and economic "globalization." Prior
to entering full-time teaching, Professor Hockett worked for the IMF
and clerked on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. While on
sabbatical in 2012-13 he is again working with the IMF.
Nick O'Neill is a partner at Clifford Chance LLP. He is now in
the New York office of the firm and works in the firm's international
regulatory practice.
II. DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SETTERS
Broome: Before we get into our substantive dialogue - this is
the third in the New York Lecture Series sponsored by our friends at
The Clearing House. Let me give special thanks to Jim Aramanda, Paul
Saltzman, and Dan McCardell for their help with this program and
support throughout the years. We also appreciate the support of UNC
School of Law Dean Jack Boger.
The topic of this year's program is domestic bank regulation in a
global environment-a comparative dialogue. We have divided our
discussion today into roughly four segments and the first segment deals
with domestic institutions and international standards like Basel III, just
naming one. We have a number of different perspectives represented on
[Vol. 17
D OMESTIC BANK REG ULA TION
this panel-regulatory, industry, and academic-so let me ask you,
Cyrus, to describe how domestic institutions are affected by
international standard setters.
Amir-Mokri: The way to think about domestic institutions or
any institution in any country and international standard setters is to
think about what international standard setting does. The first thing it
does is it establishes, or is supposed to establish, a level playing field.
That is, all must adhere to the same standard and all are going to be
judged by the same set of criteria. These standards include Basel. In
our world of financial services there is not only the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision but IOSCO,2 CPSS,3 and the world of insurance
has the IAIS.
4
The world is very interconnected. It is a global financial
system, especially at the institutional level. It's important to have
common rules of the road and that is particularly important for our
global financial institutions, whether U.S.-based or foreign-based. A
uniform set of standards across the important jurisdictions is critical for,
at the very least, a level playing field and to ensure that we are
respecting the rule of law.
When you reflect back on the 2008 crisis I think there is another
very important dimension to it as well, and that is the commonality of
the standards is important for a signaling purpose. The standards should
be robust so that in terms of financial stability and certainty, whether it
is from the point of view of the retail customer, the point of view of the
investor in a financial institution, or the point of view of the counter-
party to a financial institution, that at least they have the confidence that
they know who they are dealing with in a particular jurisdiction meets
the standards that the regulators and the financial sector generally would
like to adhere to. This gives everyone confidence and, as you know, the
financial sector is all about confidence. So I think these two things are
crucial: first, the rule of law certainty with a level competitive playing
field, and then second, confidence. I think these are two very important
things to keep in mind when you think about standard setting.
2. International Organization of Securities Commissions.
3. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.
4. International Association of Insurance Supervisors.
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The last thing I'll say about standard setting in domestic
financial institutions is I mentioned our global financial institutions and
the certainty that they would have if they went into another jurisdiction
in terms of dealing with the laws of that jurisdiction. There is the flip
side of it-institutions from foreign jurisdictions coming into the U.S.
Some of our domestic institutions who don't have a foreign presence
can at least have that certainty that the foreign institutions are dealing
with similar circumstances. So you don't have to just be a global player
for international standards to matter to you in a positive way.
International standards are, of course, just standards. They have
to be applied in each jurisdiction and each jurisdiction has its own
particular history. There are going to be times when variances from the
international standards, or at least interpretations, are going to be
particular to the particular structure that you have. But again that's a
balance. It's a tight balance between adhering to international standards
and having sensible local variations when it makes sense. The
variations need to be transparent so we, the domestic institutions, have
the confidence that there isn't cheating going on in another jurisdiction.
So that's how I think about international standards.
Broome: Chris, do you have anything to add?
Brummer: I think when one talks about international standards
it is important to understand the system in which international standards
operate and it is important to understand exactly what international
standards are. International standards are really different when one
thinks about other more traditional areas of international economic law
like the international trade space. When you talk about the international
regulatory architecture it's a very fragmented world.
Here is a quick overview. The big picture is that you have
agenda setting that's effectively done by the G-20.5 Formerly you had
the G-7, but in 2008, the G-20 became the primary agenda setting body
with heads of state working alongside finance ministers and central
bankers. Agenda setting is then operationalized in broad terms through
an organization called the Financial Stability Board, which serves as a
5. The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors.
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more technocratic clearinghouse and counterpart to the G-20.
Alongside the agenda setters, you have the standard setting
bodies themselves by sector -the Basel Committee for banking,
IOSCO for securities regulation, IAIS for insurance, and then you have
these specialist organizations for accounting like IASB,6 and CPSS.
Then you have the implantation by the regulators themselves who
participate in each one of those forums as well as the monitoring that's
done both through the IMF 7 and the World Bank and then through
various peer review structures. What's important to understand when
you look at this very fragmented system is that, as fragmented as it is,
it's been sort of vertically integrated since the 2008 crisis with the G-20
taking a lead with regards to financial regulation.
Many of these organizations came of age in the wake of the
Asia financial crisis, but they didn't necessarily even talk to one another
in a very comprehensive or robust way and so you had lots of gaps.
What's interesting about this-besides the fact that you have a highly
fragmented regulatory architecture which gives a lot of people
headaches because we usually think of regulations as emanating from
the domestic level but instead we have a highly fragmented
international space-is that that the rules themselves are not rules as we
lawyers typically expect. They are not hard law. They are not formal
international obligations that you see when one talks about the WTO.8
Indeed, the forums that generate the international rules are themselves
not international organizations. They are not founded by articles of
agreement like the IMF or the GATTs9 or something similar to the
WTO1 ° or the EU'1 with treaties. Instead, they are highly informal,
highly flexible, and the rules that they generate can be considered soft
law. Because they are not generally binding as a matter of international
law, there are questions that naturally arise by practitioners, specialists,
and academics as to what is the meaning of these rules. How useful are
they, particularly when lots of resources are devoted towards creating a
6. International Accounting Standards Board.
7. International Monetary Fund.
8. World Trade Forum.
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
10. World Trade Organization.
11. European Union.
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level playing field and more transparency with regards to the legal rules
that oversee financial institutions and the general trading environment?
A lot of the discussion that we will hear later today ultimately questions
just how effective are non-binding, informal rules and what is the
relationship between national regulators and these non-binding
international rules.
Despite their nonbinding nature, there are lots of incentives that
can be generated to incentivize regulators to hew closely to those rules
and for institutions to comply even in the absence of overt regulation by
their own national regulatory supervisor. At the same time, the level of
compliance is going to differ depending on the issue area and backdrop
against which rules are promulgated. The commitment to creating a
robust playing field will often depend on lots of technicalities, but
among those technicalities the institutional architecture and framework
in which those soft law nonbinding rules are generated is very important
for financial institutions as well as lawyers to understand that regulatory
environment.
Broome: Michael, I wanted to ask you how these international
standards impact an institution with the scope and size of operations of
Citi?
Heifer: I'm tempted simply to say, "Every day, in every way."
These rules affect what we do and how we do it and what activities we
conduct and what kinds of transactions we will agree to participate in.
International standards in general, for the reasons that have been laid
out, are a desirable thing for an institution that deals in a hundred
countries. At the same time, we shouldn't be unrealistic about the
problems that they don't solve because they don't solve most problems.
Host country regulators, host country governments, host country
legislators, host country politicians, and host country press will all have
their own views about what foreign banks ought to be allowed to do in
the host country. They operate and can operate effectively on some
mega issues like Basel III and bank capital but they don't solve
problems on a day-to-day basis where you operate under the rules of the
host country or you don't operate at all.
The second thing about international standards is they take a
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long time to develop. That may be a good thing in some instances and
may be a bad thing in other instances. History teaches, I think, that
enforcement of international standards varies dramatically among
countries and regulators. The quickest and easiest example of this is the
discussion about risk weights applied to the balance sheets of different
institutions, whose balance sheets at least on a GAAP or international
standard basis look pretty darned similar and wind up with dramatically
different risk-weighted assets, the denominator in the capital ratio. We
can all agree on what the numerator is, or we can get close enough on
what the numerator is. But you can take somebody's actual 2 % capital
and make it look like 10% capital pretty easily by adjusting the
denominator through the risk-adjusted assets. Not that anyone would
actually do that, but it could raise some questions.
The other question that I just note because it is coming up as a
subject of congressional hearings is the application of the Basel III
standards to community banks in the United States. That is a very
controversial, highly politicized issue right now so it is one thing to
apply these international standards to international banks or banks that
could be significant even in domestic economies and yet may be a
different thing to apply them to much smaller institutions.
Broome: Nick, as an advisor to financial institutions, what is
your perspective on these international standards?
O'Neill: Well, I agree with everybody that setting a level
playing field internationally is something which organizations carrying
on business internationally wish to see preserved. The devil, though, as
everybody is saying, is really in the details of implementation and
enforcement. There are many examples of inconsistency. Many of you
will have seen the Basel III consistency assessment report that came out
in October 2012 which showed that there isn't a great deal of
consistency in international implementation. Likewise with many of the
changes that came out of the financial crisis such as the G-20
recommendations, where implementation is really all over the map.
A good example of such inconsistency might be OTC derivative
clearing. There is a clear impetus post-financial crisis to make that
market safer and more secure. If you look at how the two major
2013]
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regional blocks that have led the way in this area are dealing with this,
the U.S. and the EU, they are implementing quite differently, leading to
huge logistical challenges for organizations who are part of a global
market and who are going to have to try and work out how to
effectively segment that industry between two geographic blocks.
There is a global standard that all regularly traded liquid OTC
derivatives are going to be cleared, but the practical challenges of
implementing very different practical rules are proving to be very, very
significant to those organizations in that market. In terms of
implementation challenges, this gives rise to significant costs. People
are having to look again at their structures to work out whether they are
actually set up in a way that can really comply with those standards as
they apply in different geographies.
The EU is a good example of how long it can take and how
difficult it is to achieve true harmonization. I have practiced in London
for many years. My practice has been advising clients dealing with EU
regulations that developed through the single market during the 90s and
past the millennium. I think there we saw a real challenge of a number
of jurisdictions that are bound together by treaties and that are trying to
formulate a single market with a single set of harmonized standards
across that financial market. The truth of the matter is that this only
really started to work in the sense of actually achieving harmonized
standards once the EU achieved full harmonized implementation. So the
standards were fine but then you got a lot of gold plating as Michael
Helfer has noted. You got a lot of interpretation of what those rules
meant.
It was only once you got true harmonization of implementation
that it began to work in practice, and you could actually predict that a
rule would be interpreted and applied similarly across the EU. So that
has taken a long period of time and has developed through treaty, not as
Chris Brummer was noting in relation to international standards through
soft law. That is hard treaty and still it has twenty-odd years to develop
what is close to harmonized implementation. By comparison, many of
these international standards are a long way away from truly
harmonized implementation and application.
Broome: Bob, you get the last word on this topic.
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Hockett: Great. Just two quick thoughts. First, I'm always
struck by the way in which many aspects of financial regulation can be
readily characterized as solutions to classic collective action problems.
A collective action problem is a situation in which actions that, when
taken by individual actors, are individually rational can nevertheless
aggregate, when taken by a multitude of people, into collectively
irrational outcomes. An arms race is a classic case in point. If you are
in the midst of an arms race and your opponent is stockpiling weapons,
it is in your interest to do so as well. Otherwise, you are sort of
outcompeted. That's of course why few, if any, people ever advocate
unilateral disarmament. On the other hand, while you and your
opponent in the race are both locked in that death struggle, you are
wasting resources enormously, so it is in your best interest to come up
with some way to limit arms on both sides.
Now, if you think along these lines in connection with financial
regulation, one way of looking at, say, capital regulation is as itself a
solution to an arms race sort of situation. So basically it is in the
interest of each individual bank to hold as little buffer capital as
possible because it is stale and unprofitable when it is just sitting there,
whereas if you can lend it out or invest it you're going to earn returns on
it. Of course all of those that you are competing with, moreover, are
thinking similarly; so that if you individually hold more buffer capital
than your competitors are holding, you are putting yourself at a
disadvantage relative to them and in that sense you're unilaterally
disarming in an arms race. On the other hand, everyone's accordingly
racing to the "capital bottom" imperils the financial system and those
who take part in it. So it is in the interest of you and of all your
competitors-your fellow banks-to have something like a SALT12 or
START1 3 treaty, some kind of a "capital arms control agreement." And
that's one way of looking at domestic capital regulation.
Now if you think of capital regulation at the global level rather
than at the domestic level, the situation is structurally identical. In
12. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 21, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3736.
13. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31,
1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-20 (1991).
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effect it is in the interest of each nation to see all nations' principal
financial institutions holding a certain amount of buffer capital. For if
they are not-that is, if everybody is just competing to the point where
they simply lend out their buffer capital to the point where there is no
buffer capital-then you foment systemic instability throughout the
global financial economy just as the absence of domestic capital
regulation does within a national economy. So it is in the interest of all
of the nations, just as it is in the interest of all the financial institutions
within those nations, to have some kind of an arms control agreement,
so to speak-a common capital standard at the global level. For the
same reason it is in the interest of the banking institutions within
domestic jurisdictions to have uniform sets of standards among banks
within those jurisdictions. I think one helpful way of looking at the
Basel process, as well as most if not all other global regulatory
convergence projects, is as essentially a kind of carrying over, to the
global case, the same logic of collective action problem solving as
applies to the domestic case. It is necessary to do this, in turn, because
the global financial markets are now so fully integrated.
The second observation I think worth making here has to do
with the way soft law, as I understand it, seems to work. Soft law
works partly through the significant degree of regulatory discretion that
is conferred upon domestic financial regulators from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction-at least within the major financial jurisdictions. U.S.
regulators, for example, of course have a great deal of room in which to
maneuver in applying what generally are quite broadly stated statutory
mandates or standards. My understanding is that the story is much the
same in our peer jurisdictions. What that means in turn is that when
regulators can come together in some singular forum-for example, on
the Basel Committee or over at the IMF or within the G-20 or some
other forum-and then agree at least roughly to some common set of
standards, they've got a great deal of discretion when they get back
home to implement those very standards. What that means is that
global stability rides significantly upon the capacity of those regulators
to agree and to see things similarly.
One thing I'm struck by, and this might be a kind of rose-tinted
glasses problem on my part, is the degree to which domestic financial
regulators do seem often to see things similarly irrespective of what
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jurisdictions they come from. In my experience, American financial
regulators don't seem to be acting as champions of American
institutions while European regulators are acting as champions for
European institutions. Hence you don't typically see them bickering, or
trying to give their institutions a leg up on others', at Basel or at the
IMF or in other such fora. They seem by and large actually to share a
sort of good faith commitment to the stability of the global financial
system as a whole, and to come at the matter of domestic regulatory
coordination in a spirit of good faith collaboration. Maybe someone
will have counter-instances of that but this is how things generally strike
me in my own experience. In so far as that is the case I think it is very
good news, because these regulators do indeed subsequently wield
much discretion in their home jurisdictions in implementing the
particular standards upon which they agree in these international
forums.
Brummer: I do think there are some counter-examples of silent
participations with German and French banks and the like. Regulators
tend to understand their markets pretty well and they want to be at least
advocates for their institutions.
III. POST-CRISIS REGULATORY APPROACHES OF HOME COUNTRY
REGULATORS
Heifer: The U.S. is obviously not unilaterally disarming here.
Chris, how does Dodd-Frank14 affect domestic financial institutions
with respect to their cross-border operations?
Brummer: I think that Dodd-Frank is interesting. I think that it
is important to recognize that there was an agenda that took shape in the
Washington and London Summits of the G-20. Among the different
agenda items were some of the things that the Dodd-Frank Act tries to
address now. I can make the very depressing observation that as much
as we may complain about Basel III and capital standards, believe it or
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U. S. Code).
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not the international regulatory process has moved from the lower
hanging fruit towards the more and more difficult things. Basel and
capital standards were conceptually considered one of the easier things.
Moving then on to derivatives, OTC trading, then moving a little bit
further afield to say cross-border bank resolution, which is the nirvana
of international financial regulation.
When you look at a lot of the things that the Dodd-Frank Act is
trying to address, they are more the intermediary stage of the
international standard setting process and in particular the
implementation process. Obviously, there are two big questions when
one thinks about Dodd-Frank-the Volcker Rule15 in Title VI and the
derivatives issue in Title VII. The Volcker Rule was not part of the
original G-20 agenda so that's something to keep in mind. Before we
jump into what the Volcker Rule means from the question of
international standard setting, it is useful to note that when look at the
line items of the G-20, the Volcker rule was intentionally not brought up
as a full-fledged agenda item. That's why we have differences right
now in the Liikanen Report, 16 Vickers,17 and the Volcker Rule here in
the United States.
Title VII, on the other hand, is an attempt to implement the
broader standards of the G-20 agenda with regard to derivatives. The
tack taken particularly with OTC derivatives, even though sponsored by
IOSCO and the Basel committees, has been much more of a
transatlantic process of less than effective dialogue between the
European and American authorities. We moved faster, at least with
regards to the Dodd-Frank Act and Title VI, than the Europeans,
although obviously in their legislation they have caught up a good deal.
But the dual tracking of the Europeans and the United States has led to a
variety of inconsistencies because even though they are working
through the international standard setting process of the G-20, they are
actually adopting old school methods of international financial
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. IV 2010).
16. High-level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector
(Oct. 2, 2012), available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/bank/docs/high-
level expertgroup/reporten.pdf.
17. The Independent Commission on Banking: The Vickers Report (Sep. 12, 2011),
available at www.ecgi.org/documents/icb_finalreportI 2sep201 1.pdf.
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regulation which is trying to in some ways project your own policy
preferences via the regulation of your own domestic markets. Simply
put, if you raise your standards high enough, or if you require certain
kinds of actions be taken by foreign market participants, you can
sometimes export your foreign policy preferences abroad.
The interesting question arises when both decide to leverage
their domestic markets and their infrastructure in a way to project their
policy preferences, what happens? What happens when you have dual
reporting requirements? What happens when you have dual clearing
requirements? To what degree do duplicative regulatory requirements
lead not only to costs but also to inconsistencies that themselves are
then impossible for any one market participant to comply with? So if
Europe says "X" and the U.S. says "Y" and you can't do both, what
then are you supposed to do?
The even more complicated question is when you have the
emerging financial centers in Singapore and Hong Kong that remain
relatively quiet but then are looking at the implementation process and
are deciding that they do not like certain aspects of it. I try to tell my
students all the time that derivatives are to bonds what bonds were to
bank loans in terms of the mobility of the transaction. When you have
any part of the world that decides not to play along and you have a
financial center that ultimately erodes even the tentative commitments
that are being made at a transatlantic basis, then you have a problem.
So the U.S. adopted a more territorial approach with reporting and
clearing requirements in the Volker Rule, which is obviously still under
discussion in Europe as well here. They are adopting versions that
could have an extraterritorial impact and we will hear that what that
means depends in part on what kind of banking union the EU is going to
have. The EU nations must figure out for themselves what kind of
banking regulation they want to have, but clearly we have to think of
mutual recognition programs to bridge the gap for a more efficient
regulatory process.
Heifer: Cyrus, your views on this?
Amir-Mokri: These are all very important issues. On Dodd-
Frank I will say a couple of things in terms of how it deals with
2013]
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international and cross-border issues. Some of the issues that Dodd-
Frank tried to address were truly international in nature. I start with the
logic of Title I, which is consolidated supervision. A lot of that grew
out of AIG18 and its London subsidiary, given the nation state-based
jurisdictional structure that we have even with global financial
institutions. One of the problems that needed to be solved was what do
you do with an institution that is multi-jurisdictional. Who has the
ultimate accountability for the oversight? That is one way that there is a
nexus between cross-border activity, multijurisdictional activity and
what Dodd-Frank tries to do.
Someone earlier mentioned the resolution. That is another good
example, but it again ties to the same question. Now it is no longer
supervision, it is resolution, recovery, liquidation - whichever variant of
that applies at that moment. It does implicate important cross-border
questions and cooperation between jurisdictions. So that is another
nexus Dodd-Frank has with cross-border activity that I think is
important.
You also mentioned OTC derivatives. I think it is important to
distinguish between situations where you have a domestic market and
then someone comes in and participates in that market and the rules of
the game are really that jurisdiction's rules of the game. Whether they
adhere to an international standard or not is an analytically distinct
question, but at least you are subject to those rules. So that is different
from standard-setting situations. Then you have situations that ask:
when does a jurisdiction's rules have extra-territorial effect? Those are
also some important issues that are raised in Title VII.
Whenever you embark on the kind of effort that the
international regulators and the G-20 have been trying to do over the
last few years the surprising thing shouldn't be that there are differences
of viewpoint or that there is not perfect harmony in implementation or
that there is going to be debate about who has what detail better. To
me, the more amazing thing has been the actual convergence. It is not
perfect. Everyone is not on the same page about every detail. To me
that's a given. But think about it a couple of years ago. You're
absolutely right. The G-20 pronouncements did not have proprietary
18. American International Group, Inc.
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trading on the list. Nevertheless, today we have multiple jurisdictions -
whether it is the U.K., the EU - maybe not taking the same exact
approach that the U.S. Congress took, but the intuition is that there are
certain kinds of trading that should be separated from the retail deposit
institution. That intuition has grabbed hold in multiple jurisdictions.
OTC derivatives-the same. I remember during the Dodd-Frank
process, several principles the Congress was considering. One was
regulation of the major dealers, then central counter-party clearing, and
then there was this other issue of pre-trade transparency and executing
trades on a platform. There was convergence not on every detail, but
some very major issues in a short period of time. There has been
convergence. We can have different opinions on how each of us
individually is going to assess those, but it has been remarkable on very,
very complex issues in a short period of time.
Michael, I take your point that regulators do not always see eye
to eye, but there is a lot to the observation that there has been significant
convergence.
Heifer: Let me follow up on that point. We are familiar with
the Volcker Rule and the one thousand questions the regulators asked
about it. Let me ask Nick to talk about Vickers and the way it
approaches what many people say is the same issue.
O'Neill: Vickers is an attempt at ring-fencing in a way that is
quite different from Volcker. What Volcker is doing is throwing certain
activities that are considered too risky out of institutions. What Vickers
is doing is ring-fencing the retail deposit taking business of U.K. banks
into a separately ring-fenced entity, and therefore, insulating those
activities from riskier activity. I suspect that Vickers will not have too
huge of an effect in the U.S. because the U.K. banking market is
relatively concentrated among the major U.K. clearers. Vickers also has
a rather long time frame to come into effect. We don't even have the
legislation yet. We have a proposal. The idea is that it won't fully
come into effect until 2019. Essentially what it does is it takes the retail
deposit clearing business of the major U.K. clearing banks and requires
it to be ring-fenced away from the investment banking and what are
considered other riskier activities of U.K. bankers.
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There are a couple of other developments in the U.K. which
may well have more direct and potentially more immediate effect on the
U.S. industry. One is a push from the U.K. regulator for financial
institutions to have greater levels of subsidiarization. That is certainly a
trend post-financial crisis. They are looking for a lot of entities with big
branches in the U.K. to subsidiarize. That is partly because of the
concerns they had with the flight of capital out of London and how easy
that proved at the time of the financial crisis. The FSA 19 has even
pressed EU incorporated entities to subsidiarize within the EU
framework. There should not be a requirement to subsidiarize. You
should, as an EU institution, be able to freely branch into the U.K. to
whatever size you want. The FSA is pushing back against that.
The other thing that I would highlight that is going to have
potential impact cross-border from the U.K. is the recent FSA proposal
relating to deposit protection and deposit preference schemes.
Essentially what the FSA is proposing involves banks that come from a
non-EU state which has a deposit protection scheme preferring their
own state depositors - an example would be the FDIC scheme here.
The proposals in the U.K. are that those banks will also eventually be
required to subsidiarize their U.K. deposit-taking activity or offer U.K.
depositors equivalent protection to domestic depositors.
All of these ring-fencing efforts-and we'll hear about
Liikanen-are an example of where you have regulators looking to
achieve broadly the same thing, which is to create a degree of ring-
fencing without an international standard. There is clearly a common
agenda of some sort here, but nobody really sat down after G-20 and
said, "Well let's have some sort of approach to ring-fencing." What
you have is different regulators who have gone about it in very different
ways and produced really quite different proposals. So, even if not
perfect, having some form of attempt to produce an international
framework/standard is preferable to not doing so.
Heifer: Bob, he set you up nicely to tell us about Liikanen.
Hockett: Yes - thanks very much. So, first, most of the
19. Financial Services Authority.
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attention that Liikanen has received thus far has been grabbed by its
ring-fencing-like proposal, partly for the reasons we've been talking
about. It is another instance in which a kind of global consensus
appears to be emerging. In this case, rather informally and not pursuant
to any particular forum in which common standards are meant to be
arrived at. So you have the Volcker Rule initiatives here in the States,
then the Vickers Commission recommendations in the U.K. with a
particular form of ring-fencing. Liikanen then presents its own version
of the same basic idea - structural segregation between deposit-taking
and speculating - for the European Union. In this case the idea would
be to take whatever segment of a particular financial institution group
that was engaged in what we in the States are calling proprietary trading
- whether highly risky speculative trading or less gratuitously risky
market making activities - and cordon it off by ensuring that it is taking
place within a separate legal entity. The principal, and by now quite
familiar, concern is that depositors' funds not be used - and don't find
their way - in to financing or funding that kind of activity. An allied
concern is to make clear that there is no explicit or implicit government
guarantee of the risk-taking entity simply by dint of its loose connection
to a deposit-taking entity within some financial group. Whether
Liikanen's rendition of this familiar form of segregation will work is
almost the same question as to whether U.K.-style or Vicker-style ring-
fencing will work. And it of course likewise shares a close family
resemblance to the question whether some version of the Volcker Rule
might work, although that is of course a tougher question because we
don't yet know what the Volcker Rule as articulated and applied is
going to be. In any event, that piece of the Liikanen Report has gotten
the most attention lately, and that is partly, one supposes, because
argumentation over the Volcker Rule has been so conspicuous of late.
But we should take care to note now that Liikanen is not just a
ring-fencing proposal. There are at least five distinct proposals made by
Liikanen, and what is most striking about the set of five is how many
similarities there are between what Liikanen is recommending, what the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission here in the United States
recommended - and Dodd-Frank accordingly includes - and what the
Vickers Report has recommended.
The first, flagship proposal under Liikanen is the ring-fencing
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proposal separating proprietary activities and deposit-taking activities,
making critical use of the corporate form and the legal separation of
corporate entities in so doing. We've just covered that.
The second salient proposal found in Liikanen is an orderly
liquidation authority type arrangement very much like that which you
find in Dodd-Frank. It connects up with the ring-fencing pillar as well,
of course, in that the Report recommends that this pillar is necessary for
the purposes of arriving at a plausible liquidation, or living will plan, for
a European institution. You might even require yet stricter separation
between the proprietary risk-taking activities on the one hand and the
deposit-taking activities on the other hand, of institutions that are large
or interconnected enough as to require living wills. So there is a link up
in the sense that you might require even more than the garden variety
separation offered by ring-fencing in the case of an institution that you
require to compose a plausible living will.
Third, there is a recommendation in Liikanen that institutions
rely more heavily on various kinds of so-called "bail-in" lending or
debt. There are two reasons. The first is to enhance the capital buffer.
For example, in addition to having the equity buffer that ordinary
capital regulation would require, you would have more granular
prescriptions with respect to the kind of Tier 2 capital or the kinds of
debt capitalization or financing of which firms would avail themselves.
The second reason for encouraging "bail in" is to make the incentives
on the part of those creditors a bit more dramatic. The hope would be
that those creditors would prevail upon institutions to be a bit more
careful and take less risk. This justification of course relies upon certain
assumptions concerning the practical governance of financial
institutions that might and might not be plausible in particular
jurisdictions. But the point here at present is only to explain Liikanen,
not to critique it.
Fourth, there is a grab bag of recommendations that all have
analogs in both Dodd-Frank and Vickers. For example, more robust
risk-weighting standards-another instance of the perennial effort to
head off gaming of capital standards. "Good luck with that," as they
say. But at least attention is being drawn to that. In addition, this
portion of Liikanen pays special attention to leverage rates, reliance on
short-term funding in the financing of longer term investments, and
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other forms of systemically dangerous maturity mismatch. These are
the same concerns as have been discussed increasingly here in the States
under the rubric of so-called "shadow banking." So that is the fourth
recommendation, the sort of "grab bag" of related residual
recommendations made by Liikanen.
Fifth and last, something that has not gotten as much attention in
U.S. legislation, is the recommendation that corporate governance
provisions again be looked at more carefully. It's kind of Jack Bogle-
type stuff. That has not found its way into real robust or significant
legislation here in the states, but at least has been part of the
conversation. Should we have more powerful and more attentive risk
management functions within institutions? Ought there be more power
on the part of the boards to prevail on the management not to take
excessive risks? This, too, probably falls within the category of "good
luck with that." But in any event, it's a familiar kind of proposal. We
have heard lots of discussion about it here in the States even if it has not
found its way into significant or robust legislation. Similar attention has
also of course been paid to the same subject over in the U.K.
I'll just say in closing on Liikanen that, first, again, those five
basic proposals are more than just ring-fencing. And second, what's
striking is that not only the ring-fencing, but all five bear striking
resemblances to what you find here in the States post-Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission and post-Dodd-Frank, as well as to what you find
being discussed in the U.K., especially under the Vickers rubric.
IV. OPERATIONS OF A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION IN MULTIPLE COUNTRIES
WITH PRIMARY REGULATION BY THE HOME STATE REGULATOR
Broome: Bob, we're going to let you go first this time on our
third topic.
Hockett: I'd better take a drink.
Broome: Do you think it makes sense for financial institutions
that have operations in multiple countries to be primarily regulated by
their home state regulator?
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Hockett: I suppose I have two thoughts on that. The first is
that, in so far as domestic regulators converge on more or less uniform
standards pursuant to the processes we have been talking about, it might
not make that much difference. But that's a big if As a few of the
panelists have mentioned, there is a significant caveat even if you arrive
at common, broadly articulated standards. The devil often is in the
details, and the "devilish people" are often striving and struggling with
respect to those particular details. Moreover, the implementation can
indeed sometimes differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction according to
the zeal and effectuality of the regulators and the effectiveness of the
legal system more broadly. One should accordingly take the familiar
observation that there is convergence underway with the appropriate
grain of salt. But being the perennial optimist whom I said earlier that I
am, I tend to think that this convergence process is going to continue
and there will be more and more uniformity looking forward. So far as
that turns out to be the case...
Heifer: Bob, can I have some of that stuff you're drinking?
Hockett: It's Kool-Aid. So that's the first point - so far as
convergence happens (I can imagine a bumper sticker on that), who the
regulator is doesn't make as much of a difference. The second point,
which may be a slight, but only slight overstatement, is that when a
particular financial institution is headquartered or primarily located in
one jurisdiction but has significant operations in another jurisdiction, it
is never the case that that other jurisdiction is somehow prevented or
prohibited from regulating within its territorial borders in the interest of
protecting various parties who might stand to be harmed by the
operations of that institution. So, for example, if a Chinese bank tries to
operate here in the U.S., I don't think that the Americans have to run
and say, "Oh my God," or text, "OMG," then cry "these under-regulated
Chinese banks are coming to America and we're all headed to Hell in a
hand-cart!" My bet is that the Chinese banks would tell you that they
beg to differ, because of course they have to deal with the U.S.
regulators just as surely as the U.S. financial institutions must. So in
that sense, I think that the kind of alarm that is sometimes sounded
about overreliance on the regulatory power of the regulator in the
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jurisdiction where the financial institution in question is headquartered
is overstated.
Broome: Michael, you obviously have a different opinion on
that. From an operational perspective, has Citi ever found itself at a
disadvantage in competition in foreign countries with entities that are
subject to a different home state regulator than the U.S.?
Heifer: Not so much that it interferes with our basic business
model. But certainly sometimes we're at a competitive disadvantage
because of U.S. rules. So looking forward, depending on how the
Volker Rule comes out with respect to sovereign debt, we may be at a
competitive disadvantage because of U.S. rules. We may be at a
competitive disadvantage on Basel III because home country regulators
will interpret risk weights in a way that effectively requires us to hold
more capital. Sometimes it is the application of what the U.S.
regulators do; sometimes it's the result of what the domestic regulator
does. There are limits on branching and establishment of new banks in
various countries that are applicable to foreign banks, including Citi,
that limit their ability to compete in those countries. These limits may
be to promote the domestic banking system or for other reasons.
Sometimes U.S. institutions are put at a competitive disadvantage
because of something the U.S. government does with respect to
applications by banks from the host country to operate in the United
States. Then there is retaliatory action, which is usually in the form of
delay or non-action on applications. Sometimes, although it is unusual,
non-banking related political or financial disputes involving the United
States government can lead local host countries to take action or to
decline to take action, the effect of which is to put us at a competitive
disadvantage. So the answer is yes. It does not fundamentally affect
the business model, but it happens often enough that it is something that
we deal with on a regular basis.
Broome: Cyrus, how does the U.S. regulatory structure try to
level this playing field for institutions that are subject to U.S. law?
Amir-Mokri: One way is a commitment to international
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standards. Michael Helfer is right, international standards don't answer
every question. There are going to be peculiarities of national law that
have no relationship to the subject matter of the standards.
Nevertheless, hopefully the standards are covering a lot of major issues
that financial institutions have to deal with.
For the second way, let's distinguish between the activities of
U.S. institutions outside the United States and the activities in the
United States. Outside the United States, international standards are
very important. In the United States, international standards are very
important, but if there is a non-U.S. financial institution operating in the
U.S., making sure that the relevant laws are not discriminatory but
applied equally, both at the regulatory level and at the enforcement
level, is also important so that everyone has the confidence that they're
playing by the same set of rules.
I want to make one other point. I think regulators and law
makers and people in government have to be very sensitive to the kinds
of points that Michael Helfer just made about how domestic regulation
of financial institutions or the bank holding company at home and some
of the requirements that may get imposed on them have consequences
for their behavior abroad. Just as we have to be sensitive to that we
have to understand that there's a flipside to it and what we try to do, at
least from the government's perspective, is to come up with a set of
rules, regulations, laws that build confidence in our financial
institutions. So one person's activity restriction or other kind of
regulation is going to be another person's viewing that as a measure to
not only give confidence to investors, but also counterparties, and also
to raise the integrity of what we do. So sometimes we have to think
hard about the consequences. But there is a lot to be said about the
integrity of business done by U.S. institutions outside the United States.
By integrity I don't mean fraud or something like that. I'm talking
about dealing with others in a way that gives confidence that this
institution is one I can deal with. If I put my money there, I'll be able to
get it back and the terms of the deal are going to be the terms of the deal
and so on. I think those are things that hopefully are not only not going
to disadvantage our institutions, but actually going give them a leg up
and give the brands that the U.S. has a different meaning to anyone who
wants to do business with them abroad.
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Broome: Nick, what's, what's your perspective on all this?
O'Neill: On a practical, day-to-day level since the financial
crisis, I do not see regulators rushing to seize any control over the
operations in their jurisdictions of entities that have a different home
state. To a certain extent the trend is going in exactly the opposite
direction. As the Basel standards and the other international standards
become more embedded over time there's a greater level of confidence
by the major international regulators when they are dealing with an
entity that is branching into their jurisdiction, and which has a home
state in one of those jurisdictions that has properly embedded those
international standards. But since 2008, and perhaps I'm looking at it
particularly from a U.K. and EU context, there is a greater level of
nervousness about significant operations operating in a jurisdiction
where the local regulator does not have ultimate regulatory control.
You saw that particularly in the U.K. because its financial center has so
many entities coming in whose home state is elsewhere. I think that led
to a greater push for living wills, including as applied to branches, and
for local subsidiarization. Not just in things like Vickers and other
proposals, but actually in practical terms where we've seen some
regulators say, "Look, this operation in our jurisdiction is just too big,
we don't really, fully understand how it relates to the home state, we
want some greater degree of control." Meanwhile, though we have also
seen more of a "college" approach to regulation of some major
international institutions - something that seems to have worked well.
Maybe this will grow over time. Practically, what this means is that you
have an entity which has major operations in two or three large financial
centers where the regulators get together and cooperate to a greater
extent, not necessarily in a formal role-sharing/authority-sharing sense,
but in the sense of meeting together in some informal sense and
swapping notes and discussing priorities. I think that is a potentially
positive way forward. But I don't see a regulator ceding control to
home states on an international basis, not totally - or at least not for the
foreseeable future.
Broome: Chris, do you have any last words on this segment?
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Brummer: Last words? Using the words "last words" and
"financial regulation" is always dangerous.
I think when one considers international regulation, we should
bear in mind that regulators are people and people make mistakes. The
international standards are themselves the result of negotiation and a
compromise. Then there are local differences. If one looks at other
jurisdictions, there are some in which one could argue that the United
States has a competitive advantage with regard to its rules and
regulations. There are some jurisdictions that we have seen in Europe,
including the United Kingdom, that have been very enthusiastic about
"over-complying" with Basel III. The issue of gold plating is a big deal
if you're going to Switzerland, or if you're even Sweden. So if those
countries, for example, are deciding to go further than the United States,
what specifically does that mean for our competitive advantages or
disadvantages? Who is the weakest link?
I think that it's important to get back to one original idea-an
observation about transparency of the international regulatory system.
The international standard setting process has generally not been the
focus of enough political interest, or for that matter, there's not been an
institutional apparatus behind the international standard setting process
sufficient to identify the level to which different jurisdictions, including
the United States, complied with, or did not comply with any
international standard. I'm not going to go into the depth as to the
monitoring process associated with the IMF and the World Bank, but
generally speaking unless you were a client state of the IMF or the
Words Bank, you didn't necessarily have to undergo any kind of
surveillance as to the degree to which you're complying. There was an
earlier remark about the EU, for example, not complying with some
important aspects of Basel III.
To a certain degree, a securities law surveillance framework is
necessarily imported to an international banking world. The degree to
which disclosure becomes important-disclosure as to what a financial
product is-is as much a product of a legal environment as it is of a
specific trading environment. Understanding who your counterparty is
and whether or not they are adequately capitalized in order to enter into
certain kinds of transactions is an important consideration for financial
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institutions. So at the international level there is, to a certain degree, a
hope that the markets themselves can help with discipline. That
ultimately by helping to identify, let's say, jurisdictions that are not
complying with Basel III, or under-complying with Basel III, market
discipline can ensure that financial institutions are going to have higher
costs of capital or be subject to certain kinds of problems when they're
trying to look for counterparties for certain kinds of transactions. Thus
international standards in themselves can provide a benchmark of sorts
for the market, and can be viewed as a tool for empowering investors
and different kinds of market participants.
I think that the question of who regulates what doesn't get you
to the deeper issue that there needs to be a lot of cooperation.
Jurisdictions have different historical backgrounds, different traditions,
and different institutional frameworks that are going to necessarily lead
to varying levels of implementation. The question is whether or not
jurisdictions can have enough faith and trust in one another to provide a
means by which you, on the one hand, provide robust supervision and
regulation, but at the same time, you minimize some of the
inefficiencies that one sees with cross-border transactions.
A tool that has not been of enormous use, but will have to be at
some point of increasing use, will be thinking through what kinds of
mutual recognition programs can be in place between leading financial
centers, and to use that process. Some people say that is just
deregulatory. But, as a securities lawyer, if you look at the MJDS2 ° and
Canadian disclosures with regards to selling their securities in the
United States and vice-versa, sometimes it's a glide path to fewer rules
and fewer regulations. But, at the same time, where certain gaps are
identified, the different participants in the regulatory framework can
indeed raise standards and incentivize partners to raise standards. The
point is that going forward, as we get to the implementation process,
there will inevitably be pressure to identify the degree of acceptability
of the departures from the international standard setting process. I think
that regulators and their market participants all have to understand the
inevitability ultimately of that process.
20. Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System.
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V. THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN DOMESTIC REGULATION AND
GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
Heifer: Let me start with Cyrus. The question is whether it
makes sense to devise different regulatory structures for wholly
domestic institutions, from those institutions that operate cross-border.
And, if it does make sense, what do you believe is the likelihood of that
happening?
Amir-Mokri: I don't know that I would say wholly different. I
mean, I think it will depend on the nature of the activity that you are
regulating and the nature of the institution. To take a very simple
example, suppose a broker-dealer has a purely domestic presence (that's
hard to imagine) and then a broker-dealer has an international, or a
cross-border activity. I would not necessarily apply different rules for
the same activity. But, as I said earlier and as others have commented,
different jurisdictions have particular traditions. I think institutions
sometimes engage in purely local activities. There could be a
justification that those kinds of activities that are particular or peculiar
to a jurisdiction should be regulated differently. But to me the analysis
really centers around what is the activity you are regulating? What are
the entities you are regulating? That's how I would start the analysis.
Hockett: My own tendency is to think that the more important
distinction is between systemically important and non-systemically
important institutions. Naturally enough, I suppose, the systemically-
important institutions are going, by their very nature, to be more often
than not cross-border in their operations. But that is just a general
tendency. I can certainly imagine that, on a case-by-case basis, there
might sometimes be particular kinds of activity associated with cross-
border transacting that is not associated with domestic transactions. In
that case, it would make sense to regulate differently. But in the
abstract, without any reference to particular transactions, it is kind of
hard to say much more than that. So in this sense I would go right along
with Cyrus.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The discussion concluded and Professor Lissa Broome thanked
the panelists for their comments and the audience for its attention. She
invited all to a reception for continued conversation.
